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BOX 3.1EURO AREA CRISIS: TRANSMISSION CHANNELS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD
The latest stage of the global financial and economic crisis has 
been particularly severe and long-lasting in the euro area, taking 
the form of a sovereign debt crisis (see Chapter 1 of this Report), 
with significant repercussions in the rest of the world. Indeed, 
since summer 2011 the renewed concerns over the sovereign 
debt of Greece and other euro area countries have seen a height-
ening of tensions, which have again become a determining factor 
in the world outlook.
The euro area represents around 20% of world GDP and a some-
what smaller percentage of world trade (about 15%, excluding 
intra-euro area trade). Therefore, euro area spending and relative 
prices can influence goods and services exports and imports to 
and from the rest of the world. From a financial standpoint, the 
importance of the euro area is even greater, because it acts as in-
termediary in a significant proportion of global capital flows, and 
European financial institutions’ interconnections with the rest of 
the world are deep-rooted and complex. On Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) data,1 euro area banks account for between 
25% and 40% of world finance, depending on the institutional 
sector considered.
The real transmission channels of the sovereign debt crisis to the 
rest of the world takes place mainly through international trade in 
goods and services. The greater saving of households (precau-
tionary or to reduce leverage), the postponement of investment 
projects (as a result of heightened uncertainty) and ongoing fiscal 
consolidation reduce the aggregate demand of the euro area and 
thus exports from the rest of the world. This channel should be 
especially important in those regions with greater trading expo-
sure to the euro area. Panel 1 shows that the United Kingdom and 
the eastern European countries (which, moreover, are very open 
economies) would be particularly vulnerable, since the euro area is 
the destination of more than 50% of their goods exports. In the 
cases of Asia (including China), Latin America and the United 
States, the euro area accounts for 5-10% of the trade in goods. As 
regards trade in services, although the euro area is a major market 
for the United Kingdom and for certain Latin American and African 
countries, the potential impact is mitigated by the fact that ser-
vices exports represent a still-small percentage of GDP in com-
parison with goods exports. According to the IMF2, the global im-
pact through the trade channel is not particularly significant. Spe-
cifically, in the most exposed countries it would reduce GDP at the 
most by 0.2 pp per percentage point of contraction in euro area 
aggregate demand. The latest economic data suggest that the im-
pact through the trade channel may have started to manifest itself 
in some countries. Panel 2 shows that in the second half of 2011 a 
more marked loss of dynamism in exports to the euro area than in 
exports to the rest of the world became discernable. More spe-
cifically, in the same period the euro area export growth differential 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world turned negative in the cases of the 
United States, Japan and eastern Europe, while for China and 
emerging Asia the already negative differential widened. In the 
case of Latin America, the positive differential recorded during the 
first six months of 2011 shrank considerably.
The trade channel may be strengthened by the gains in euro area 
price competitiveness if, as a result of the crisis, the euro depreci-
ates against other currencies. According to Dieppe et al.,3 for each 
percentage point that the euro depreciates, there is a 0.3 pp in-
crease in euro area exports (i.e. imports by the rest of the world) 
and a 0.1 pp fall in euro area imports (i.e. exports by the rest of the 
world). Since late summer, the euro has depreciated to a certain 
extent – 8% against the dollar and 5% on a multilateral basis. The 
downturn in economic activity and exchange rate developments 
tend to be reflected in migrant workers’ remittances which, while 
modest in the case of the euro area (totalling some €25 million per 
year), are an important source of income in poorer countries.
The financial transmission channels are much more complex and 
their scope more difficult to quantify on account of the multiple 
interlinkages in place. As is known, the euro area sovereign debt 
crisis triggered the adjustment in equity markets during the sum-
mer. Indeed, the financial stress indicators, which are a measure of 
US and UK market volatility, increased significantly whenever the 
risk premium of the euro area periphery countries rose (see Panels 
3 and 4) to levels not seen since end-2009, with the onset of 
Greece’s difficulties. Equity markets and the banking sector were 
the main focus of the heightened uncertainty.
The worsening situation in the euro area may also be adversely 
affecting the market valuation of those companies in the rest of 
the world, whether they are in the financial sector or not, with 
strong trade or financial ties with the euro area. This exposure is 
most apparent in the financial sectors of countries such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, whose businesses are 
highly exposed to the public and private sectors in the euro area. 
Indeed, US banks’ exposure to European debt increased in 2011, 
owing partly to the size of their positions in credit derivatives. 
These derivatives, mainly credit default swaps, became more 
commonplace on account of the impairment of some European 
countries’ debt. In contrast, the United Kingdom, with a lower ex-
posure to European debt through derivatives, saw its exposure 
fall slightly. Other financial agents have been more active in their 
response to these shocks by reducing their exposure to euro area 
risk. One of the most prominent cases is that of US money market 
funds. A large portion of the assets belonging to these funds is in 
the form of fixed-income securities issued by credit institutions. 
The funds’ exposure to euro area institutions had increased until 
mid-2010, when it accounted for almost 40% of investment hold-
ings in financial institutions. During 2011, however, this exposure 
fell due to the sovereign debt crisis, to stand at 14% by year-end. 
Lastly, in the case of the non-financial sector, empirical evidence 
1  See World Economic Outlook (2012), IMF, April.
2  “Euro Area Policies: Spillover Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation 
and Selected Issues”, IMF Country Report No. 11/185.
3  See A. Dieppe, A. González Pandella, S. Hall and A. Willman (2011), 
“The ECB’s new multi-country model for the euro area. NMCM – with 
boundedly rational learning expectations”, Working Paper Series, No. 
1316, European Central Bank.
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suggests that businesses with high exposure to the euro area, 
being recipients of euro area production or funding from its finan-
cial institutions, may have seen their market values adversely af-
fected. Were this to persist, it could impact shareholder wealth 
and investment decisions.
A final, potentially significant, financial channel seems to be 
working in the opposite direction, namely through the withdrawal 
of euro area financial institutions’ activity from other geographical 
regions, particularly eastern Europe. Here, there are three types 
of factor to be taken into account. First, given the difficulty in 
obtaining permanent external funding, major European banks 
may decide to strengthen their core capital through disinvest-
ment in other regions. Thus far, there is no evidence to suggest 
that this has occurred on a large scale. Second, there are signs 
that financial institutions are embarking upon a process of spe-
cialisation on account of the new global financial scene, which 
could lead them to abandon certain lines of business and, conse-
quently, investment in specific regions. However, this is not ex-
clusive to European institutions, nor does it stem from the sover-
eign debt crisis. Lastly, European institutions are faced with 
higher costs for funding obtained on international markets, which 
is used to finance part of their activities in other regions. As a re-
sult, they are scaling down their activity in certain segments, such 
as international trade credit. On the back of this development, 
Asian and US competitors are taking the place of European insti-
tutions and gaining market share.
BOX 3.1EURO AREA CRISIS: TRANSMISSION CHANNELS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD (cont’d)
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4  UNITED KINGDOM. FINANCIAL STRESS INDICATOR (f) 
SOURCES: Banco de España, Datastream, Eurostat and IMF. 
a CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States. 
b A positive value indicates that exports to the euro area increased more than those to the rest of the world. 
c Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
d Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania.  
e Korea, India, Indonesia and Thailand. 
f An increase in the index denotes greater stress in thDjnancial markets. Daily data. The indicator is made up of a simple average of three sub-indices relating to: 
the banking sector (1-year and 10-year government bond spreads, Treasury bill yield and 3-month repo spread, and banking stock price index); securities market 
(corporate bond spread, overall stock market index and implied volatility of the overall stock market index); and exchange rate (implied volatility of the real effective 
exchange rate). 
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BOX 3.2UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
The exhaustion of the leeway available to traditional monetary poli-
cy instruments to act, once official interest rates reached levels 
close to zero, has led the central banks of the main developed 
economies to activate a wide range of unconventional measures, 
against a background of persistent economic and financial fragility. 
These include most notably the extraordinary liquidity and long-
term refinancing operations, the large-scale asset purchase pro-
grammes and the changes in balance sheet composition (as part of 
quantitative easing or credit easing strategies1 ). The objectives pur-
sued may be the re-opening of certain markets, the maintenance of 
financial stability, the reduction of funding costs and the expansion 
of nominal spending. The use by central banks of these instruments 
has been widespread, although the US and UK central banks have 
applied them with greater intensity, particularly asset purchases.
The Federal Reserve announced a credit easing strategy in November 
2008, undertaking to purchase $600 billion in debt and mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) held by federal agencies with a view to 
smoothing the functioning of these market segments. In March 2009 
it raised the volume of this operation by $850 billion and it initiated, 
moreover, a quantitative easing strategy with the purchase of $300 bil-
lion in Treasury bonds. In a second stage, in November 2010, the 
quantitative easing strategy was expanded following the decision to 
purchase an additional $600 billion worth of Treasury bonds. Overall, 
asset purchases amounted to $2.35 trillion, equivalent to 15.3% of 
GDP. Subsequently, in September 2011, the Federal Reserve initiated 
a public debt portfolio reallocation strategy, known as Operation Twist, 
which involved replacing short-term securities with other, longer-dat-
ed instruments so as to lengthen the average maturity of the portfolio 
without increasing the size of its balance sheet. Previously, in August, 
it had decided to keep its MBS portfolio stable through the reinvest-
ment of the instruments maturing in securities of the same type.
The Bank of England initiated a quantitative easing strategy 
through an asset purchase facility (APF) in March 2009. From that 
month up to February 2010, purchases centred on public debt, for 
an amount of £200 billion. In October 2011, a second phase was 
launched, which finalised on May 2012 and which has raised the 
total amount of purchases to £325 billion (23% of GDP).
There are numerous transmission channels for a central bank’s asset 
purchase programme to financial and macroeconomic variables (see 
accompanying diagram). First, they have a direct effect on the price 
of the assets purchased, by exerting downward pressure on their 
yields. Lower yields, along with the increase in liquidity arising from 
the purchases, will lead investors to portfolio shifts towards other 
assets, such as shares or corporate bonds, whose price will also 
increase. Moreover, the announcement of the purchases plays a sig-
nalling role in respect of the monetary authority’s objectives, which 
will affect interest-rate expectations over different horizons, as well 
as the exchange rate.2 Furthermore, especially in the case of credit 
easing strategies, these operations can help prop up specific mar-
kets subjected to stress, providing them with liquidity. The increase 
in asset prices has a bearing, in turn, on the recovery in wealth, 
which, combined with the reduction in financing costs, will boost 
consumer spending and investment and, ultimately, GDP and em-
ployment. This will all be conducive to brighter economic prospects 
and enhanced business and consumer confidence, provided that 
the exit mechanisms from these easing strategies are credible and 
that inflation expectations remain anchored. Ultimately, the injection 
of liquidity into the economy will also induce an increase in the sup-
ply of credit, given the improvement in the economic climate.
Any assessment of the economic impact of the asset purchase pro-
grammes is a complex task, since it is difficult to isolate their effect 
from that of other factors. Further, to compare their effectiveness from 
one country to another, the relative size of the programmes must be 
taken into account. In the case of the United States, the Federal Re-
serve increased its share in the Treasury bond market by 8.9 pp to 
16.6% of the stock at end-2011; likewise, it came to account for 
19.1% of the outstanding balance of federal agency-backed debt 
and MBS. In the United Kingdom, after the end of the first round of 
quantitative easing, the stock of government bonds held by the cen-
tral bank accounted for 22% of the total in circulation, and this per-
centage rose to 32% in May. Several studies offer estimates of the 
impact of these programmes on financial and macroeconomic varia-
bles (see accompanying table). For the case of credit easing and the 
first phase of quantitative easing in the United States, some results 
point to a downward impact on 10-year Treasury bond yields of be-
tween 30 bp and 80 bp, while in the case of federal agency bonds 
and MBS, the fall is estimated to be around 130 bp and 110 bp, re-
spectively, although the impact would have been minimal in the MBS 
market segments not backed by federal agencies. According to other 
research, the purchases would also have affected the term structure 
of interest rates, lowering 10-year rates and increasing short-term 
ones.3 Finally, it is estimated that the dollar depreciated by between 
3.6% and 10.8%, depending on the counterpart currency, in the pe-
riod between the two days before and the two days after the an-
nouncement of the purchases. In the case of the United Kingdom, 
empirical evidence suggests that the first phase of the APF signifi-
cantly and immediately reduced the interest rates on public debt by 
around 100 bp, likewise lowering the rates on corporate bonds in 
general, reflecting a balance sheet restructuring effect. Further, the 
level of real GDP is estimated to have increased by between 1.5 pp 
and 2 pp, and inflation by between 0.75 pp and 1.5 pp. These figures 
would be equivalent to a reduction in the official interest rate of be-
tween 150 bp and 300 bp.
In sum, the evidence available indicates that the asset purchase 
programmes have been conducive to reducing financing costs 
1  Quantitative easing involves increasing the size of the central bank’s bal-
ance sheet through the purchase of securities financed by an expansion 
of bank reserves. Since the aim is to inject money into the economy to 
boost nominal spending, the key point of this strategy is how the bal-
ance sheet expansion is financed. Conversely, the focus of credit easing 
is on the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet assets.
2  Insofar as investors decide to invest in foreign-currency-denominated 
assets, part of the effect on the exchange rate will come about through 
portfolio reallocation.
3  See J. Hamilton and J.C. Wu (2011), The Effectiveness of Alternative 
Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment, Working Pa-
per no.16,956, April, National Bureau of Economic Research.
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BOX 3.2UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (cont ’d)
Central Bank 
asset purchases 
Policy 
signalling 
Total wealth (+) 
Conjdence (+) 
Portfolio 
reallocation 
Liquidity in 
markets (+) 
Liquidity in the 
system (+) 
Price of assets (+) 
and exchange 
rate (–) 
Financing 
cost (–) 
Nominal 
spending and 
income level (+) 
Inkation 
target 
Bank lending (+) 
TRANSMISSION CHANNELS OF THE ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES 
Financial variables
IMPACT OF THE ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES (a)
United States United Kingdom
Long-term Treasury bond yield
Decrease of between 30 bp and 100 bp (b). Sack 
(2009), Gagnon et al. (2011), and Neely (2011)
Decrease of 100 bp. Joyce et al. (2011a)
Yield on federal agency-backed bonds and MBS
Decrease of between 150 bp and 110 bp, 
respectively. Gagnon et al. (2011)
—
Corporate bond yields
(investment grade)
Decrease of 70 bp. Gagnon et al. (2011) Decrease of 70 bp. Joyce et al. (2011a)
Corporate bond yields (high yield) — Decrease of 150 bp. Joyce et al. (2011a)
Exchange rate
3.6% - 10.8% depreciation depending
on the counterparty currency. Neely (2011)
Effective depreciation of 4%. Joyce et al. (2011a)
Macroeconomic variables
GDP
Persistent 0.4% increase.
Chen et al. (2011)
Increase from 1.5 pp to 2 pp Joyce et al. (2011b), 
Kapetanyos et al. (2012) and Bridges 
and Thomas (2012) 
CPI Very small. Chen et al. (2011)
Increase from 0.75 pp to 1.5 pp. Joyce et al. (2011b), 
Kapetanyos et al. (2012) and Bridges 
and Thomas (2012) 
SOURCES: Banco de España; Bank of England; J. Bridges and R. Thomas (2012), The impact of QE on the UK economy — some supportive monetarist arithmetic, 
Bank of England Working Paper no. 442; H. Chen, V. Cúrdia and A. Ferrero (2011), “The macroeconomic effects of Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs”, Staff 
Report, no. 527, December, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; J. Gagnon, M. Raskin, J. Remache, y B. Sack (2011), “Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal 
Reserve: Did they work?”, Economic Policy Review, May, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; M. Joyce, A. Lasaosa, I. Stevens and M. Tong (2011a), “ThDjnancial 
market impact of quantitative easing in the United Kingdom”, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 113-161; M. Joyce, A. Lasaosa, I. Stevens  
and M. Tong (2011b), “The United Kingdom’s Quantitative Easing Policy: Design, Operation and Impact”, Quarterly Bulletin, vol. 51, no. 3, March, Bank of England; 
G. Kapetanios, H. Mumtaz, I. Stevens and K. Theodoridis (2012), Assessing the economy-wide effects of quantitative easing, Bank of England Working Paper no. 
443; C. Neely, (2011), The Large-Scale Asset Purchases had large international effects, Working Paper no. 2010-018C, January, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
and B. Sack, (2009), “The Fed’s expanded balance sheet”, address at the Money Marketeers New York University, December.   
a In the case of thDjnancial variables, the impact refers to the effect on such variables around the date of the purchase announcements, unless otherwise stated. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, it refers to the impact of thDjrst round of quantitative easing. 
b Corresponds to the estimated impact up to March 2010. 
BOX 3.2
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UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ASSET PURCHASE PROGRAMMES IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM (cont’d)
and have contributed to upholding nominal expenditure, al-
though there are also signs that their effectiveness may be dimin-
ishing over time. Furthermore, the asset purchase programmes 
pose some risks that must be borne in mind. First, the flattening 
of the yield curve may place a brake on the necessary process of 
deleveraging (public and private alike), narrow bank business 
margins and delay the clean-up of bank balance sheets. Second, 
the expectation that central banks will intervene persistently in 
the system may exacerbate moral hazard and encourage exces-
sive risk-taking; further, a dominant role of central banks might 
ultimately replace, in part, the financial intermediation function of 
the private sector. Costs may also emerge in terms of diminished 
monetary policy credibility, especially in a setting of fragile public 
finances. Last, the very exit strategy poses challenges, especial-
ly if the withdrawal of the extraordinary stimuli has to be done 
quickly. Accordingly, the central bank’s communication policy 
must be transparent, clearly signalling the objectives and the im-
plementation of the exit strategy.4
In any event, even with these caveats, there is extensive consensus 
concerning the decisive contribution of this set of extraordinary mon-
etary measures to preserving financial stability; by making it easier for 
the banking system to obtain financing, the measures alleviate banks’ 
liquidity problems and allow the necessary deleveraging of the bank-
ing system to unfold in a scenario of diminished tensions.
4  See Hervé Hannoun (2012), “Monetary policy in the crisis: testing the 
limits of monetary policy”, address before the 47th SEACEN Governors’ 
Conference, Seoul, 13-14 February; and Masaaki Shirakawa (2012), 
presentation at the conference “Central Banking: Before, During, and 
After the Crisis”, organised by the Federal Reserve Board and the Inter-
national Journal of Central Banking.
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BOX 4.1FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES
In recent years Greece has been the main source of instability in 
the euro area, acting as the catalyst of a crisis of confidence in the 
European project. The Greek economy is probably the most pat-
ent example of the costs which, sooner or later, arise owing to an 
inadequate adjustment to the demands that membership of an 
economic and monetary union imposes. Its experience also illus-
trates the weakness of European supervisory arrangements and 
the difficulties involved in designing an efficient mechanism for 
crisis management, and for providing financial support to ailing 
Member States.
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Like other countries, after joining EMU in 2001 Greece saw its do-
mestic demand expand notably. This was readily financed by the 
inflow of foreign capital at low interest rates, lured by favourable 
growth expectations. But the pressure of demand far exceeded 
the responsiveness of an economy which did very little to correct 
its structural rigidities, thereby prompting a continuous erosion in 
competitiveness, low productivity growth and wage growth above 
the euro area average. In 2008, the real exchange rate appreciated 
relative to its equilibrium value by between 20% and 30% on IMF 
estimates; the current account deficit exceeded 10% of GDP, and 
foreign indebtedness climbed to comparatively very high levels 
(see Panel 1).
Strong imbalances also built up in the general government sector 
(see Panel 2). The continuous growth of spending, the generosity 
of pension and healthcare systems, the inefficiencies of tax collec-
tion and tax evasion meant that the budget deficit and public debt 
persistently exceeded the reference values set in the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Problems concerning the reliability of the fiscal sta-
tistics further complicated the situation. In 2004 the European 
Commission had initiated an excessive deficit procedure against 
Greece and had drawn attention to the scant quality of its fiscal 
statistics. But it was decided to close this procedure in 2007, it 
being considered that Greece had adopted the necessary meas-
ures to attain a deficit of below 3% of GDP in 2006 and 2007. Nor 
did the global financial markets, where a climate of widespread 
under-pricing of risk prevailed, react to this accumulation of vul-
nerabilities. Indeed, in the months leading up to the crisis, the 
Greek sovereign debt spread over the German Bund stood at 10-
40 basis points (see Panel 3), far below that observed in the years 
prior to membership.
The situation took a radical turn in late 2009, when the recently 
elected government revised the deficit estimates for that year 
upwards from 6.7% of GDP to 12.7% (with the figure later ex-
ceeding 15%). In the context of international financial crisis in 
which this came about, the revision was the trigger for a sudden 
re-evaluation of risk in the Greek economy, which hampered its 
access to the capital markets, and mired it in a liquidity crisis that 
precipitated the request for financial assistance. Given the lack 
of instruments in the framework of euro area governance ena-
bling aid to be channelled to this country, the euro area countries 
decided, following a process not free from difficulties, to extend 
bilateral loans totalling €80 billion, to which €30 billion granted 
by the IMF were added, making up a total amount of almost 50% 
of Greek GDP. This initial loan was conditional upon compliance 
with an ambitious fiscal adjustment and structural reform pro-
gramme, and stipulated interest rates and non-concessional 
terms which, ultimately, proved excessively burdensome and 
had to be revised.
The adjustment programme began satisfactorily. From 2009 to 
2011, Greece saw through one of the swiftest and sharpest of 
fiscal consolidations in recent economic history as it cut its struc-
tural fiscal deficit by almost 10 pp of GDP (see Panel 4). But, on 
the reforms front, implementation fell short owing to the lack of 
administrative capacity and political will, which contributes to ex-
plaining why inflation and the current deficit remained at high lev-
els, despite the prolonged recession. The programme, conceived 
as a stop-gap so that Greece could carry out the necessary 
change and restructuring and restore growth, underestimated the 
economy’s dysfunctionalities. Nor did it anticipate the heighten-
ing of tensions and the limited scope of the economic recovery at 
the euro area level. The Greek economy, in short, became im-
mersed in an increasingly deeper recessionary spiral, which made 
it difficult to meet its fiscal targets and restore market confidence. 
The crisis took on a social and political dimension which ultimate-
ly triggered the fall of the government and the formation of a coa-
lition government.
Doubts grew in the opening months of 2011 over the possibility of 
Greece being able to return to the markets to raise funding within 
the envisaged timeframe, and the need to increase the financial 
assistance was considered. Discussions on this second pro-
gramme took place against the backdrop of significant political 
tensions. These ultimately fed through to the markets, given cer-
tain countries’ insistence on the need to share the costs of the aid 
with the private sector (PSI). At first, at the summit meeting on 21 
July, there was agreement on a “soft” restructuring mechanism 
based on voluntary private sector participation so as not to com-
pound the difficulties of the Greek banking system and of other 
European banks. But it soon became apparent that, in order to 
restore the sustainability of Greek debt, restructuring on a greater 
scale was needed. In March 2012, a 53.5% haircut was applied to 
the nominal value of the bonds, tantamount to 78% in terms of 
current discounted prices, and which was extensive to 95% of 
Greek debt in private hands.
After the restructuring the second official aid programme was ap-
proved, for €130 billion, on top of the first programme, and the 
consolidation and reform strategy was revised. So as not to make 
the economic recession more acute, the new programme delays 
part of the fiscal adjustment outstanding to 2013-2014, and it has 
entailed a boost to labour market and services reform, which will 
now be assisted by a technical group of international experts. A 
sizeable portion of the funds (€50 billion) will be earmarked for the 
recapitalisation of financial institutions. As a result, Greece is ex-
pected to restore positive growth rates as from 2013, and its pub-
lic debt should fall below 120% of GDP in 2020.
Even so, factors of risk remain. To be able to cut debt to below 
120%, Greece will have to persist with what is practically unprec-
edented fiscal austerity1, running primary surpluses of over 4% 
to 2020 and beyond (see Panel 5), and an extensive privatisation 
programme. The restructuring of Greek public debt has involved 
one of the biggest haircuts applied in recent years, and the em-
pirical evidence available suggests that the bigger this haircut is, 
the longer it will take private investors’ confidence to be re-
BOX 4.1FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES (cont ’d)
1  Fiscal consolidations: lessons from past experiences, OECD Economic 
Outlook, 2007.
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stored.2 This might be compounded by the fact that a large por-
tion of the debt will be in the hands of official creditors, who may 
be received as preferential creditors in respect of any new Greek 
bond. Finally, the difficulties in forming a stable government fol-
lowing the elections on 6 May cast doubt over the degree of 
commitment to the programme that the government resulting 
from the election scheduled for June may have. All told, after a 
period of several years in which the economy has been shackled 
by uncertainty over fundamental issues affecting the country, in-
cluding the possibility of a disorderly default or in relation to con-
tinuing euro area membership, the rigorous implementation of 
the new programme by the Greek government should contribute 
to dispelling uncertainty and offer an opportunity for Greece to 
make a radical change, enabling it to improve competitiveness, 
restore growth and ensure the sustainability of its public financ-
es. If this opportunity is seized, investor confidence may be re-
stored more swiftly.
BOX 4.1FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES (cont ’d)
2  J. Cruces and C. Trebesch (2011), Sovereign default: the price of hair-
cuts, CESIFO working paper 3604.
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BOX 4.2THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA
The benefits arising from financial integration are well-known: to 
smooth the proper channelling of funds from economic agents 
and countries with saving surpluses towards those posting defi-
cits; and to allow risks to be shared and diversified more efficient-
ly. From the outset, the Monetary Union has played a key role as a 
catalyst in this integration process in the euro area. Throughout 
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BOX 4.2THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA (cont’d)
this period, headway in this field has given rise to an increase in 
cross-border financial flows within the area, and in the volumes of 
foreign assets and liabilities accumulated by euro area countries.
However, the crisis that began in 2007 has interrupted the trajectory 
of European financial integration in a setting in which, at the interna-
tional level, ongoing globalisation has also been severely affected. 
The mid-2011 heightening of tensions on the sovereign debt mar-
kets has slowed cross-border financial activity among euro area 
countries and has given rise to the segmentation and, indeed, re-
nationalisation of certain markets. One of the consequences of this 
interruption in private cross-border payment and revenue flows 
within the euro area has been the need for the Eurosystem to act as 
an intermediary, a role previously performed by the interbank market. 
The reflection of this has been a sizeable build-up in NCB debit and 
credit balances with the ECB in TARGET2 (see Panel 1). This return 
by investors to domestic financial markets has highlighted some of 
the weaknesses of the EU’s financial and institutional architecture.
One usual measure of financial integration is the so-called “home 
bias”, which translates into the presence, in investor portfolios, of 
a higher relative volume of domestic as opposed to foreign assets 
than would be suggested by international portfolio diversification 
models. French and Poterba (1991), in Investor Diversification and 
International Equity Markets, document this phenomenon. None-
theless, during the 1990s and the opening years of the current 
millennium, there had been a reduction in home bias both in bank 
balance sheets and in the balance sheet of OECD countries’ insti-
tutional sectors, most especially euro area countries.
The financial crisis has brought to a halt and, indeed, reversed this 
dynamic of the past two decades, and the first signs of an increase in 
the relative weight of domestic assets were already evident in 2007. 
One of the markets where this development has been most patent is 
the interbank market. After a long period of decline, the proportion of 
financing negotiated with domestic credit institutions increased in just 
one year from 65% to a figure above 70% in 2008, a rise which 
strengthened further in the second half of 2011, following the stepping 
up of sovereign tensions, to close to 75% in early 2012 (see Panel 2). 
These distortions were also mirrored in interbank market interest rates, 
affecting the first link of the monetary policy transmission chain (see 
Panel 3). But, even in the case of bank loans, the mild declining profile 
seen since the onset of the euro in the proportion of domestic activity 
– despite the fact that the retail nature of this segment means that 
these transactions are in the main between lenders and borrowers 
resident in the same country – came to a halt in 2007 (see Panel 2).
Banks’ fixed-income securities portfolios evidenced similar be-
haviour in this period. After a sizeable increase in debt purchas-
es from issuers with the same nationality in the years 2007 to 
2009, the worsening of tensions on sovereign public debt mar-
kets caused credit institutions also to begin offloading foreign 
securities (see Panel 4). Country by country, the increase in 
home bias in credit institutions’ fixed-income portfolios has 
been across the board since 2007 and, in fact, in some of them 
– namely the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland – the preference for 
domestic bonds has even attained levels higher than those re-
corded prior to the introduction of the euro (see Panel 5). Home 
bias is higher in the Mediterranean countries, which has rein-
forced the interaction between sovereign risk and banking risk 
(see Box 1.1). However, the increase in the presence of domestic 
bonds has been more pronounced in the countries less affected 
by sovereign tensions, which may reflect the greater credit risk 
perceived in bonds issued by other States as a consequence of 
the sovereign debt crisis.
Although the information available is more limited, this same develop-
ment is seen in institutional investors’ portfolios. Thus, in 2011 the 
presence of euro area cross-border assets has diminished both in 
investment funds and in insurance and pension funds. While the 
flows of both have been significantly reduced in 2011, the breakdown 
of between domestic and other euro area assets shows a sizeable 
disinvestment in non-domestic securities (see Panel 6).
Finally, it should be stressed that some weaknesses in the euro 
area’s institutional framework have tended to amplify the effects 
of the crisis on the area’s financial stability and its cross-border 
financial activity. The imperfect harmonisation at the European 
level of banking regulation and supervision, and the virtual ab-
sence of a macroprudential dimension to both hampered the de-
tection of vulnerabilities before the crisis and, once the crisis was 
in train, posed an obstacle to efficient crisis management, con-
tributing to the fragmentation and indeed the re-nationalisation 
of certain market segments. In response to these weaknesses, 
the EU has launched a series of reforms aimed at improving co-
ordination in financial regulation and supervision both at the 
macro- and microprudential levels. It has also promoted meas-
ures geared to strengthening banks’ resilience, improving infra-
structures and advancing harmonisation at the European level. 
Nonetheless, it is vital that euro area countries should make 
headway in resolving the limitations that the existing and emi-
nently national frameworks for financial crisis-management and 
resolution evidence in the context of monetary union.
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Since 2008 Spain’s economy has been mired in a severe downturn, 
which has prompted a significant rise in the number of business 
closures. Based on available business demography data for Spain1, 
it is estimated that during the period 2008-102, in net terms (start-
ups minus closures) some 65,000 businesses, on average, closed 
each year. This contrasts with an average annual net increase of 
almost 120,000 businesses over the period 2002-073. Admittedly, 
business start-ups and closures are part and parcel of the develop-
ments in any economic system, in which progress is made by real-
locating resources from inefficient firms to more competitive pro-
jects. But this virtuous cycle can become distorted if viable busi-
ness initiatives ultimately succumb to external factors. That would 
adversely affect physical and human capital and, therefore, the 
economy’s medium and long-term growth potential.
The about-turn in new business creation is the consequence of 
both the fall in the number of new projects and, more particularly, 
the rise in the rate of business closures. Thus, while the number of 
business closures averaged 270,000 per year during the period 
2002-07, in 2008-10 this figure rose to 391,000. An analysis of the 
distribution of business closures by size and sector of activity (see 
accompanying table) reveals a notable increase in the number of 
closures of businesses with between 1 and 9 employees. As for 
sectors of the economy, during the crisis all of them have recorded 
business closure rates higher than in previous years, with a marked 
increase in the construction sector, where 16% of pre-existing 
businesses have closed, and the hotel and restaurant sector, 
where the number of closures has risen to 14%. However, a com-
parison with other EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom), using Eurostat data available only to 
2009, shows that the increase in business closures in Spain during 
the economic crisis has been similar to that observed in other 
economies (see Panel 1).
With available business demography data, it is also possible to 
analyse the impact of business closures on employment develop-
ments. Based on Eurostat figures, Spain was the European econ-
omy where the number of persons employed across all active 
businesses most declined during the crisis. In 2009 numbers fell 
by around 6%, compared with 2.1% in Italy, 2.6% in Germany and 
3.6% in Portugal, while the United Kingdom recorded a slight in-
crease of 0.3%. In the case of the Spanish economy, the negative 
contribution of business closures to job destruction was very sig-
nificant, at around 4 pp, and accounted for just over 60% of the 
fall in overall employment. This contribution, exceeded only by the 
negative contribution of business closures in Portugal, was much 
larger than that in the rest of Europe’s economies.
For a better understanding of this phenomenon, the main determi-
nants of business closures are analysed below using data drawn 
BOX 5.1ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF BUSINESS CLOSURES IN SPAIN DURING THE LATEST RECESSION
Total Without employees 1-9 employees 10 or more employees
SECTOR 2002-2007 2008-2010 2002-2007 2008-2010 2002-2007 2008-2010 2002-2007 2008-2010
TOTAL 8.8 11.7 11.3 13.5 6.6 10.5 2.6 2.7
Manufacturing 7.5 9.1 12.8 14.6 6.2 7.8 2.1 1.9
Mining/extraction/quarrying 5.5 6.1 11.0 11.4 4.8 6.2 1.5 0.4
Energy and recycling 3.1 5.2 3.7 5.4 2.8 5.8 2.5 1.5
Construction 9.9 16.4 13.0 17.6 7.9 16.5 3.9 5.3
Distribution and sale of vehicles 9.3 10.7 12.5 13.9 6.4 8.1 1.7 1.5
Real estate services 6.4 11.8 8.1 9.9 4.4 15.1 1.8 3.5
Transport 6.7 8.5 7.8 9.7 5.2 7.5 1.6 1.5
Hotels and restaurants 12.8 14.1 16.5 17.7 10.4 12.2 4.3 3.1
Post and telecommunications 10.7 12.7 14.0 16.8 9.4 9.2 3.5 1.8
Financial services 8.8 10.5 11.0 12.7 4.3 6.2 2.1 2.0
Other market services 7.7 10.5 9.3 11.0 5.1 10.1 2.7 2.3
Non-market services 7.8 10.4 10.5 12.4 5.3 9.2 2.4 2.7
SPAIN: BUSINESS CLOSURES. DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR (a) 
SOURCE: DIRCE (NACE-93 until 2007; NACE Rev. 2 since 2008). 
a Percentage of total companies from previous year. Average for the period.
1  The reference statistic for Spain for the business census analysis is the 
information provided by INE via the Central Business Directory (DIRCE), 
which draws mainly on fiscal information. International comparisons are 
based on data made available by Eurostat, following an internal data 
editing process which makes registration and de-registration data sup-
plied by individual countries comparable.
2  Last year for which data is available.
3  This figure includes both the self-employed and mercantile companies.
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BOX 5.1 ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF BUSINESS CLOSURES IN SPAIN DURING THE LATEST RECESSION (cont’d)
from the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office-
Mercantile Registers4 and statistical information on business clo-
sures provided by the DIRCE (the latter relating solely to compa-
nies5). Furthermore, a multivariate probit model is estimated, in 
which the dependent variable is a dummy which takes a value of 1 
if the business exits the market between 2008 and 2010 and a 
value of 0 if it does not. Two sets of potential explanatory variables 
are identified. First, specific “structural” business characteristics, 
such as company size, age, export activity and recourse to tempo-
rary employment, are computed and their value taken as constant 
and equal to the value in the pre-crisis period (2006-07). The sec-
ond set of variables, which are more cyclical in nature and whose 
values can therefore change during the crisis period6, includes the 
ratio of indebtedness7, the financial burden8, change in profit for 
the year, a proxy for the degree of company wage flexibility/rigidi-
ty9 and, lastly, the average customer payment cycle, a variable 
which aims to capture the influence of late or non-payment of in-
voices on the probability of business closure10.
The results reveal that one of the major determinants of busi-
ness closure is size (see Panel 2). More specifically, a business 
that had fewer than 10 employees when the crisis started has a 
50% higher probability of closure than an identical, but larger11, 
business. Nevertheless, the importance of this factor diminish-
es with age (micro-businesses with over 20 years of activity in 
4  Only firms incorporated as mercantile companies are required to file their 
accounts with the mercantile registers. No information is therefore avail-
able for sole proprietorships.
5  A sample was taken of businesses active in the period 2006-07 and for 
which information was available on variables traditionally considered to 
be relevant in the empirical literature.  Data editing left over 140,000 
companies, with around 210,000 observations for the analysis.
6  Although these variables lag by one period (or two) to avoid problems of 
endogeneity wherever possible, it being assumed therefore that they are 
pre-determined once the business ceases to exist.
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7  Defined as the interest-bearing borrowing of a business relative to its net 
assets.
8  Percentage of financial costs relative to the sum of gross operating prof-
it and financial revenue.
9  Defined as the difference between the variation in a company’s wages 
relative to the sector average.
10  Also included are control variables for the sector of activity, region and 
year of observation.
11  Closure probabilities are compared for businesses operating in the 
same sector, region and year, assuming that the value of the remaining 
variables is equal to the average across the distribution.
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BOX 5.1ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF BUSINESS CLOSURES IN SPAIN DURING THE LATEST RECESSION (cont’d)
2007 have a 20% lower probability of closure than a business 
facing the crisis after one year of activity), export activity (a 22% 
lower probability of closure) and proportion of temporary staff 
(4% lower in the case of businesses with a temporary employ-
ment ratio in the tenth percentile of distribution vis-à-vis busi-
nesses with a ratio in the 90th percentile. The analysis also 
shows the importance of financial position: a business with a 
ratio of indebtedness and a financial burden below the tenth 
percentile has almost 40% less risk of closure than a business 
at the opposite end of the distribution. Additionally, the late or 
non-payment of invoices has also been identified as one of the 
main determinants of business closures in Spain in recent times. 
Thus, a small business with an average customer collection period 
exceeding 150 days will have a 10% higher probability of closure 
than a business of the same characteristics but with a collection 
period of less than 30 days. Moreover, the impact of the delay in 
customer payment diminishes significantly as the size of the 
business increases12.
In conclusion, based on the business demography statistic, the impact 
of business closures during the current economic crisis in Spain has 
increased in terms of the destruction of the productive base and job 
losses. Business closures have been especially pronounced in con-
struction sector-related activities, as well as among sole proprietor-
ships and micro-businesses. Furthermore, an analysis of individual 
data on business closures identifies specific variables which increase 
the probability of closure, such as small size, low export capacity, wage 
rigidity, high level of indebtedness and long customer collection period.
12  The combined effect of size and late or non-payment of invoices is consider-
able due to the extent of the interplay between both variables. Thus, a small 
business with a payment cycle of more than 150 days is around 80% more 
likely to close than a large business with the same customer payment cycle.
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BOX 5.2UNEMPLOYMENT SENSITIVITY TO GDP GROWTH: OKUN’S COEFFICIENT FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY
According to estimates for different countries, the ratio between 
changes in the rates of unemployment and GDP, widely referred to 
as the “Okun coefficient”, usually averages around -0.3, i.e a 1 pp 
fall in GDP tends to cause a 0.3 pp increase in unemployment. 
Notwithstanding, in Spain, between 2008 Q2 and end-2011, un-
employment rose by 3 pp for each percentage point of cumulative 
decline in GDP – the largest relative increase in unemployment 
observed in advanced economies1.
The top panel of the accompanying chart below shows changes in 
the unemployment rate and GDP growth during both the current 
and early-1990s crises, the starting point being the final quarter of 
the expansive cycle prior to both recessions. As can be seen, the 
latest recession has had a significant effect on the unemployment 
rate, although the crisis is proving to be both deeper and longer 
than the previous recession. The behaviour over time of Okun’s 
coefficient can be analysed by estimating the ratio of the unem-
ployment rate (u) to GDP growth as follows:
ut = tGDPt-1t
The bottom left panel of the chart shows the outcome of the esti-
mation using a recursive procedure which estimates an average 
value for parameter  for every period. The recession in the early 
1990s saw an initial increase in the absolute value of this coeffi-
cient. Its pace in fact intensified in the subsequent period of ex-
pansion, in which strong job creation brought about a significant 
reduction in the high level of unemployment. As for the more re-
cent period, since 2008 the elasticity of unemployment to changes 
in GDP has also been greater.
A time-variable Okun coefficient can also be estimated using a 
linear model, assuming a random walk, or a model allowing the 
1  For recent country estimates of this coefficient in a number of countries, 
see World Economic Outlook (2010), IMF, April.
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
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BOX 5.2UNEMPLOYMENT SENSITIVITY TO GDP GROWTH: OKUN’S COEFFICIENT FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
existence of two possible states, which follow a Markov process, 
each with a different value for Okun’s coefficient. The outcomes 
obtained using the two approaches tend to point to relative stabil-
ity in Okun’s coefficient for the Spanish economy until the start of 
the current crisis. Thus, in the first case, the estimates indicate a 
sharp increase in the coefficient from 2008 Q4 to 2009 Q1. In the 
second case, the two-state model gives Okun coefficients of -0.6 
and -1.6, with a very high probability of entering the high-elasticity 
state after 2008 Q4 (see bottom right panel of the chart).
The determinants of the value of Okun’s coefficient can be identi-
fied by breaking down the change in the unemployment rate using 
the following approximation:
u lnY+ln(Y/H)+ln(H/N)+ln(LF)
which simply approximates changes in the unemployment rate (u) 
taking the sum of the GDP growth rate (Y), with a negative value, 
and the growth rates of productivity per hour (Y/H), average work-
ing hours per employee (H/N) and labour force (LF).
Since 2008, the four addends have contributed to the rise in un-
employment (see accompanying table). More specifically, the 
sharp increase in Okun’s coefficient in the recent crisis can be 
linked to two main factors: the increase in the labour force, which 
has not been adversely affected by the worsening labour market 
conditions, and the surge in productivity, partly associated with 
large-scale shedding of construction sector jobs. Available data 
suggest that the buoyancy of productivity is not the result of a 
reallocation of jobs to more productive sectors, but rather of 
strong productivity gains in each of them, coupled with the pace 
of the job destruction observed2. Moreover, contrary to what has 
happened in other European countries, not only have working 
hours per employee not fallen during the crisis in an attempt to 
soften the impact on employment, they have actually increased 
slightly.
In short, one of the main characteristics of Spain’s labour market is 
excessive employment volatility and, consequently, as shown 
above, a high elasticity of unemployment to economic activity. This 
high elasticity is related, inter alia, to the labour market’s institu-
tional framework, which hinders adjustments in wages, hours and 
other working conditions and, instead, encourages job destruction, 
mainly of those employed on temporary contracts. Additionally, dif-
ferent empirical results tend to show an increase in Okun’s coeffi-
cient in the recent crisis to even higher levels from an international 
perspective, which seems to be related to the severe adjustment in 
construction sector jobs and the increase in the labour force. Nev-
ertheless, the recent labour market reform is expected to allow 
working conditions to adapt better to businesses’ individual finan-
cial situations and, in future, to foster a more balanced adjustment 
between wages and jobs in the face of adverse shocks.
2  Aggregate productivity growth can be broken down into a first compo-
nent which captures sectoral weighted productivity growth, a second 
component which captures the impact of sectoral job reallocation to 
sectors with different levels of productivity, and a third residual com-
ponent which captures crossover effects. Calculations for the most 
recent period suggest the first component accounts for the sharp 
growth in productivity.
GDP Productivity Hours per employee Labour force
Unemployment rate
(EPA)
1981-1984 -1.1 4.4 -1.6 0.3 1.7
1985-1991 -3.9 2.2 -0.7 1.7 -0.5
1992-1993 0.0 2.6 -0.4 0.6 2.4
1994-2000 -3.9 0.5 -0.2 2.1 -1.2
2001-2007 -3.4 0.6 -0.6 3.0 -0.3
2008 -0.9 0.8 0.3 3.3 3.1
2009 3.7 2.7 0.4 0.9 6.7
2010 0.1 2.3 0.3 -0.1 2.1
2011 -0.7 1.9 0.7 0.0 1.4
2008-2011 0.6 1.9 0.4 1.0 3.3
BREAKDOWN OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE GROWTH 
SOURCE: Quarterly National Accounts and EPA (INE).  
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BOX 6.1THE PRIVATE-SECTOR DELEVERAGING PROCESS IN SPAIN. COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND 
LESSONS FROM HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
The indebtedness of Spanish households and non-financial cor-
porations grew at a very fast pace during the latest upturn (be-
tween 1995 and 2007), reaching high levels in relation to GDP 
both from a historical perspective and in comparison with other 
advanced economies1 (see Panels 1 and 2). Although a large 
part of the increase in these indicators is in response to struc-
tural changes in the Spanish economy in that period (belonging 
to an area of greater macroeconomic stability and a permanent 
reduction in interest rates), the levels reached were excessive 
and it is necessary for them to be steered towards more moder-
ate values.
The deleveraging process has already begun, albeit not at an even 
pace to date. Following the outbreak of the crisis, debt ratios con-
tinued to climb due to the inertia of the financing flows and the 
sharp contraction of GDP (the denominator of the ratio). Subse-
quently, they tended to stabilise and from the second half of 2009, 
they moved on a downward path. From the peak reached in Sep-
tember 2009 (87% of GDP) until the end of 2011, the household 
debt ratio has declined by 5.9 pp (see Panel 3). This contraction 
was the result of the combined effect of a series of factors: 1.9 pp 
are accounted for by the fact that the volume of new loans has 
been lower than repayments of outstanding debt (the net flow of 
operations was negative); 1.9 pp are attributable to inflation (which 
reduces the real value of previously incurred debts); 0.7 pp are due 
to real GDP growth (the denominator of the ratio), and a further 
1.3 pp, to loan write-offs (loans which have been removed from 
lenders’ assets since they are deemed difficult to collect). As for 
SOURCES: ECB, Federal Reserve, .Ejce for National Statistics and Banco de España.
a The debt ratio is obtained as the quotient between debt and GDP of the quarter in annualised terms, and is seasonally adjusted.
b In the case of the United States, it is calculated as the variation in the stock minus loan write-offs.
c Calculated as the quotient between the debt of noMjnancial corporations, excluding credit for construction and real estate services, and national GDP excluding 
the gross value added of these branches of activity.  
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1  In this box the debt ratios are calculated as the quotient between debt 
and GDP of the quarter in annualised terms and are seasonally adjusted. 
This approach, which is not usually used, provides a more accurate date 
for the peak in the series.
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BOX 6.1THE PRIVATE-SECTOR DELEVERAGING PROCESS IN SPAIN. COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND 
LESSONS FROM HISTORICAL EVIDENCE (cont’d)
corporations (see Panel 4), the indicator fell to a greater extent 
(8.6 pp) from the high recorded in the second half of 2009 (139% 
of GDP). The breakdown by factor shows that, as in the case of 
households, all the components contributed to the decline in the 
indicator (except for the heading “other changes in stock”), espe-
cially net financing flows and inflation.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, economies in which 
private debt had also reached high levels, a deleveraging process 
has also been observed recently which, however, shows some dif-
ferences compared with that of Spain. In the United States, to date 
the adjustment has been sharper for households, whose debt ratio 
also increased substantially during the latest upswing, to a higher 
level than that in Spain (99% of GDP in 2009 Q1). Thus, in less 
than three years this sector’s debt ratio has fallen back by 13 pp. 
The two factors which have contributed most to these develop-
ments have been the rise in defaults on consumer loans and those 
for house purchase, and the recovery of activity, especially in 2010 
(see Panel 3). Similarly, the notable reduction in net flows of new 
loans has also contributed to the process, although the accumu-
lated net flow of lending to this sector remained positive, unlike in 
Spain. The indebtedness of non-financial corporations, which had 
expanded more moderately during the phase of economic dyna-
mism, to represent 82% of GDP in 2009 Q1 (clearly lower than the 
value recorded in Spain), experienced a slightly more moderate 
correction (of around 6  pp), and the ratio had stabilised during 
2011, since the recovery of the flows of new operations had been 
more or less offset by nominal GDP growth (see Panel 4).
In the United Kingdom, where indebtedness had reached very high 
levels as a percentage of GDP in the two sectors (105% for house-
holds in 2009 Q1 and 120% for corporations in September 2009), 
the adjustment has been sharper to date than in Spain (see Panels 
3 and 4), both in the case of households (9 pp) and in the case of 
non-financial corporations (12 pp). The greater intensity of the de-
leveraging process is essentially explained by high inflation, which 
remained persistently above the central bank’s target, and the 
higher real growth of the British economy. Also noteworthy, as in 
the case of the United States, and unlike Spain, the deleveraging of 
the private sector is not underpinned by a contraction of financing.
The comparison of the deleveraging process in Spain with that in 
the United States and the United Kingdom shows that in Spain it 
is a slower process which turns to a greater degree on a drop in 
financial flows due, on one hand, to the lower growth of Spanish 
GDP and, on the other, especially in relation to the UK, to lower 
inflation. In the case of US households, the high volume of defaults 
has also played an important role, a phenomenon which may be 
associated with the poorer quality of the mortgages extended dur-
ing the years prior to the crisis and to institutional factors which 
tend to favour an increase in loan write-offs in adverse situations. 
Logically, households reducing their indebtedness in this way has 
a negative impact on the profitability of the banking system.
Developments to date in Spain, in any event, are largely in step 
with the historical patterns of previous deleveraging processes, 
which show that the latter are relatively protracted (lasting 
around six years on average) especially if they are accompanied 
by real estate and banking crises.2 In the case of a banking cri-
sis, during the early years there is usually an adjustment based 
to a large degree on negative net financing flows, due to the 
economy flatlining – a normal characteristic of this initial stage. 
If the degree of pressure to which Spanish banks have been sub-
ject since the beginning of the crisis, as a result of over-expan-
sion and excessive real estate exposure built up during the up-
swing in the cycle, and commitments in terms of price stability 
arising from Spain’s euro area membership are taken into ac-
count, it is difficult to think of an alternative path for the behav-
iour seen in the debts of the non-financial private sector. The 
duration of the process of credit contraction will hinge crucially 
on the economy’s capacity to resume growth which does not 
pivot on recourse to borrowing. As explained in detail in this An-
nual Report, this scenario involves greater momentum of exports 
which will have to be based on a swift recovery of the competi-
tiveness lost during the previous upturn.
2  See, for example, McKinsey Global Institute (2010), “Debt and deleverag-
ing: The global credit bubble and its economic consequences”, and O. 
Aspachs-Bracons, S. Jódar-Rosell and J. Gual (2011), “Perspectivas de 
desapalancamiento en España”, Documentos de Economía “La Caixa”.
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BOX 6.2REFINANCING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SPANISH EXTERNAL DEBT
The internationalisation of financial flows and, more generally, the 
recent globalisation of finance broaden the options for diversifying 
portfolios and financing sources. From this standpoint, a large ex-
ternal debt, particularly if accompanied by a similarly high balance 
of foreign assets, does not constitute a problem. However, an ac-
cumulation of liabilities to the rest of the world raises the exposure 
to refinancing risk in the international markets. And this, in the cur-
rent climate of financial strain in the euro area and of distrust to-
wards certain euro area countries, including Spain, is an important 
factor of vulnerability. In Spain’s case, moreover, the amount of 
claims on non-residents is well below the sum of debts to them. To 
reduce this element of risk, Spain will have to significantly adjust 
the balance of its cross-border flows by means of gains in com-
petitiveness, with related benefits in the net international invest-
ment position that will only be seen in the medium term.
Against this background, it is pertinent to analyse in detail the 
short-term refinancing risks to which the Spanish economy is ex-
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Unconsolidated individual data, excluding the Banco de España.
b 3GDCHEEDQDMBDADSVDDMSGDSNS@K@MCSGDRTLNESGDSVNRODBHjDCSQ@MBGDRHRCTDSNHRRTDRVGNRDL@STQHSXBNTKCMNSADCDCDSDQLHMDC(MMNB@RDHRSGHRCHEEDQDMBD                        
 RHFMHjB@MS. 
c The separation of MF(R' deposits bX residual maturitX is based on information from  return T9, in which loans and deposits are broken down bX residual maturitX,  
 (t should be kept in mind that return T9 refers to total business and, in the case of MF(R, does not separate residents from non-residents,
d BasicallX subsidiaries of MF(R and of large noMjM@MBH@KBNQONQ@SHNMR
e Excluding inter-companX loans constituting direct investment.
Commercial loans 
and trade credit
Total
2012
Subsequent 
Xears
2012
Subsequent 
Xears
General government 247.6 53.7 193.9 34.7 282.3
    Central government 213.2 50.4 162.8 4.9 218.1
    Regional government 27.4 3.2 24.1 26.5 53.8
    Local government 1.0 0.1 1.0 3.4 4.4
    FROB and FADE 6.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 6.0
MF(s (excl. Banco de España) 223.0 45.2 177.7 493.5 354.5 139.0 716.4
    Of which:
        Covered bonds 122.6 6.7 115.9 122.6
Other resident sectors 237.5 28.1 209.4 363.5 601.0
    (nsurance and pension funds 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 7.1
    Financial vehicle corporations 112.9 5.6 107.3 0.4 113.3
    Financial auxiliaries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
    Other jnancial
    intermediaries (d) (e)
114.2 21.7 92.5 1.8 116.0
        Of which:
            MFI subsidiaries 65.3 20.5 44.8 65.3
    Non-jnancial 
corporations (e)
9.7 0.8 8.9 173.4 183.1
    (ntercompaMX loans
    (direct investment)
178.4 178.4
    (ndividuals and NP(s 0.8 0.0 0.8 2.3 3.0
TOTAL SECTORS 708.1 127.0 581.1 493.5 354.5 139.0 398.2 1,599.8
Total TotalTotal
Securities Deposits (incl. interbank)
MaturitX (b) MaturitX (c)
Total
€bn 
 EXTERNAL DEBT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a)  
Balances at December 2011 
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BOX 6.2REFINANCING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SPANISH EXTERNAL DEBT (cont’d)
posed. Assessing them requires a knowledge of the total volume 
of debt to the rest of the world, which at end-2011 amounted to 
€1,600 bn excluding the Banco de España (149% of GDP),1 and of 
the nature of this debt. In this respect, the accompanying table 
breaks down this debt by instrument, sector and, where possible, 
maturity. Thus, for example, it can be seen that, of the €708 bn of 
external debt in the form of securities, less than one-fifth (€127 bn) 
matures in 2012. It is true that non-residents can sell on the market 
the securities maturing after 2012, but this does not represent an 
immediate reduction of the funds available to Spanish issuers, al-
though it may cause a fall in price and, consequently, a higher 
subsequent issuance cost.
Most of the other short-term debt consisted of deposits received 
by Spanish MFIs, amounting to €354 bn. MFIs, however, also 
had €149 bn of short-term deposits with non-resident institu-
tions, so the net amount to be refinanced in 2012 by the sector 
as a whole decreases to €205 bn. Also, two-thirds of these trans-
actions were collateralised interbank transactions which, al-
though not risk-free, are less exposed to refinancing problems, 
particularly since Spanish institutions began to operate on a 
large scale in the repo market through central counterparty 
clearing houses. Moreover, €103 bn of the uncollateralised por-
tion related to Spanish branches and subsidiaries of foreign 
banks, which are naturally funded mainly by their parents. Con-
sequently, funding risks would be concentrated mainly in the un-
collateralised net position of Spanish banks, which amounted to 
€20 bn at end-2011.
Finally, in the case of commercial loans and trade credit from non-
residents to Spanish entities (€398 bn in total), the accompanying 
table shows that approximately half of it related to transactions 
between companies of the same group, the roll-over of which can 
be expected to be less influenced by the current widespread cli-
mate of uncertainty.
Having said all this, an analysis of short-term refinancing risks 
should also take into account the possible existence of mitigating 
factors. In this respect it should first be noted that resident agents 
(excluding the Banco de España) had a balance of €258 bn of 
portfolio investments abroad. Thus, if difficulties were to arise in 
financing the Spanish economy, there would be some leeway for 
sectors in need of funds to raise them, partly, from those sectors 
that have invested their savings in foreign securities, as has com-
monly occurred in the last four years, over which the stock of for-
eign portfolio investment has decreased by 40%. Similarly, the 
notable rise in recourse by resident MFIs to the Eurosystem in the 
opening months of 2012 has provided them with a buffer to help 
face possible roll-over difficulties in their own or other domestic 
sectors over the next three years.
These alternative means of financing are not, however, unlimited 
and their use entails costs. External and domestic portfolios are not 
perfect substitutes for each other. Furthermore, this buffer can only 
be used temporarily, since as residents close out their external po-
sitions, it leaves progressively less leeway to keep resorting in the 
future to this source of funding to meet the economy’s borrowing 
requirements. Similarly, the greater recourse to the Eurosystem is 
not sustainable and a significant reduction in the level of external 
debt through gains in competitiveness will be a lengthy process. 
Therefore, in the short term it is crucial to persevere with action to 
rebuild the confidence of foreign investors in the Spanish economy, 
so as to restore normal financing flows with the rest of the world.
1  This figure is the amount of debt claims, which is lower than the total 
financial liabilities to the rest of the world (€2,201 bn) because a portion 
of these consists of equity claims (mainly foreign investment in the cap-
ital of Spanish firms).
